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JOINT PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON  
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES\*

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From: 3 August 1950  
To : 9 August 1950  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D.C.  
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No. 1

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet Union is in the advanced stages of preparation for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
- b. Indications are lacking of an immediate intent to reinforce North Korea but northward movement of Chinese Communist troops increases this capability.
- c. The current military situation in Korea, from the Communist standpoint, may become critical in the relatively near future. This situation may require action regarding reinforcements to be given the N.K. forces to forestall defeat.
- d. Recent indications point to a continuation of Soviet preparedness measures in all cases. Logistical preparations, particularly conservation of fuel supplies, have become increasingly apparent in Europe.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. Summary.--Northward deployment of elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army continues, apparently towards Manchuria, but there is no reliable evidence of an immediate intent to employ these troops in North Korea. There are no reliable indications that an attack on Taiwan is imminent. There are indications of unusual conservation of gasoline in Germany and Rumania and of preparations for large scale Soviet maneuvers in Europe. Recent submarine sightings may point to a pattern of Soviet submarine activity as yet undetermined.

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

\*This report, prepared by Army, Navy and Air Intelligence, supersedes the previous Army report and is therefore No. 1 of a new series.

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b. Operations of enemy component elements.

- (1) KOREA.--See current situation reports. The continuing northward deployment of Chinese Communist troops may indicate an intent to employ them in Korea but there is no reliable evidence of this at present.
- (2) CHINA.--There are no reports of a further troop buildup for an attack on Taiwan and reconnaissance has failed to reveal significant concentrations of craft on the Fukien coast. A reorganization of the Chinese Communist Army in preparation for implementation of Sino-Soviet aggressive plans in the Far East may be under way.
- (3) FAR EASTERN U.S.S.R.--Airfield construction on the Chukotak Peninsula is progressing. Reports of a movement of Soviet troops into Manchuria are unconfirmed.
- (4) EUROPE.--The U.S.S.R. has supplied additional tanks to the Rumanian Army. Soviet troops in Germany and possibly in Southeast Europe are apparently preparing for large scale maneuvers. There has been a severe curtailment of petroleum products for civilian use in portions of the Soviet Zone of Germany and in Rumania, and POL reserves in Germany are being increased.
- (5) GENERAL.--Sightings of submarines, together with possibility that Soviet merchant vessels may be refueling submarines at sea, may indicate current operations of Soviet submarines remote from their home bases.

3. See Tab "A" attached.

4. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--Capabilities for a reinforcement of North Korea are increasing with continuing northward deployment of Chinese Communist troops. The Soviet air capability in the area directly opposite Alaska is increasing. Logistical activity in Europe is increasing the Soviet-Satellite potential for sudden military action. Soviet submarine activity is apparently increasing.

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TAB "A"

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Proceedings of the JIIF Steering Committee, 9 August 1950

1. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.

a. The following report (reliability undetermined) of the alleged provisions of a military agreement included in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 February 1950 has been received. It is in part supported by recent developments in the Far East and may represent the plan for future Soviet-Chinese Communist aggression in the Far East.

(1) The purported agreement names Taiwan as the first military objective of the Chinese Communists and provides for joint Sino-Soviet military operations in the Far East; a reorganization of the Chinese Communist Army; Soviet material assistance to the Chinese Communists in the form of combat equipment and aircraft; and Soviet military advice and specialized training of Chinese Communist personnel.

(2) The plan for joint operations against the United States in time of war specifies that the Soviet Far East Army and the Chinese Communist Army will jointly defend the Far East in order to contain a large number of U.S. Forces in that area, and at the same time invade Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Japan and Alaska. Both nations will also aid the North Korean Army to invade South Korea. The Soviet theater of operations is to be north of a geographic line drawn between Korea and the Ryukyu Islands and the Chinese Communists are to be responsible for the area south of the line. The Soviets, however, will be responsible for bombing and naval operations in both areas, operating from bases provided by the Chinese Communists.

(3) The reorganized Chinese Communist Army will include an elite force of 30 divisions for tactical operations, a secondary force of 30 divisions for coast guard duty to repel an invasion, an internal security force of 50 divisions, and a labor corps for duty in Siberia. To implement this reorganization, the Soviets are reported to have agreed to supply medium and light tanks to equip 10 tank regiments, and 800 aircraft to be organized into pursuit, reconnaissance, attack, bomber and parachute units. The Soviets will undertake the training of tank crews and the air force.

Although actual confirmation of this agreement is totally lacking, its general pattern is confirmed by recent developments in Korea and by some other indications in China. Recent reports, although not entirely

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confirmed, indicate that: there have been fairly large-scale troop re-deployments in China and elements of the Fourth Field Army are reportedly en route to Manchuria; the Soviets have furnished aircraft to the Chinese Communists; the Soviets have full control of the airfields at Mukden, Dairen, Peiping, Haichow and Shanghai and of air traffic in this area; the Soviets are training Chinese paratroopers in Manchuria; and a reorganization of the Chinese Communist Army may be under way.

b. There has been no reliable new evidence that an attack on Taiwan is imminent and limited U.S. Naval reconnaissance reveals no unusual concentrations of shipping on the Fukien coast.

c. There are indications that the movement of troops of the Fourth Field Army northward through Hankow is continuing, presumably to Manchuria. There is still no evidence that the entire Army is being deployed northward.

d. Since the outbreak of the Korean war there have been a number of unconfirmed rumors that Soviet troops have been arriving in Manchuria, presumably as potential reinforcements for North Korea. Reports have also mentioned the presence of a Soviet General Zhukov in Peiping in early July and the formation of an Soviet-Japanese-Mongolian army group in the Chita area east of Lake Baikal, also commanded by a General Zhukov. All these reports have been of low reliability and it is impossible, on the basis of present information, to determine whether the Soviets are in fact moving troops into Manchuria or assembling a force in the U.S.S.R. for possible movement into Manchuria, Korea or the Maritime Territory. Coverage of the area has been insufficient to check the reliability of these reports. The formation of a combined Soviet-Japanese-Mongolian Army, however, appears unlikely.

e. There is no reliable evidence to date of the arrival of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces in North Korea. With the buildup of United Nations forces in Korea, however, the time is approaching when a reinforcement of North Korean troops will be necessary to prevent their defeat. Indications of Soviet intentions with respect to a reinforcement of North Korea should, therefore, be apparent in the near future.

f. In Indo-China, there is no new evidence of an imminent full-scale offensive by the Viet Minh, but additional reports support the previous evidence that preparations for such an offensive are continuing.

g. Despite a recent press report that Chinese Communist forces are moving towards Tibet and a reiteration of Chinese Communist intentions to attack it, there continues to be no reliable evidence of an imminent attack on Tibet proper.

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h. There is no evidence of an imminent attack on Burma or Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists, however, appear to have adopted a policy of indiscriminate firing on foreign vessels in the Hong Kong area.

i. On the Chukotsk Peninsula directly opposite Alaska, Soviet fighter planes have been observed and U.S. reconnaissance indicates that there has been considerable progress during the past year on the construction of airfield facilities.

j. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

(1) There are indications of the continuing northward deployment of Chinese Communist troops, apparently destined for Manchuria.

(2) Indications are lacking of an immediate intent to reinforce North Korea but the situation, from the Communist standpoint, will be critical in the relatively near future.

(3) There are no reliable indications that an attack on Taiwan is imminent.

(4) There are continuing indications of Viet Minh preparations for a general offensive in Indo-China, probably in the fall.

(5) The Soviet air capability in the Chukotsk area is increasing.

(6) Sino-Soviet planning may call for joint military operations in the Far East in the relatively near future, but there is no tangible evidence of a Soviet intent to employ their own forces in the Far East in the immediate future.

## 2. Soviet Intentions in Europe.

a. In Germany, the arrival of Soviet troops of the 1930 class is now accepted, a development which had been expected. There is some further evidence that Soviet units in Germany may now be above peacetime (70%) strength, and a tabulation indicates a considerably larger influx than departure of troops during recent weeks, as outgoing troop movement is continuing. However, the situation may be temporary and present evidence is insufficient to accept a build-up of Soviet units above peacetime T/O.

b. The Soviets ordered the Berlin Railway directorate, on 15 July, to submit plans for requirements to double track five major east-west lines in Germany. This order is a duplication of a previous Soviet order that the East German railways submit such plans, and is indicative of a continuing Soviet interest in this project. There is no indication, however, that the Soviets have yet ordered that this double tracking be started. Although an

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order to implement the plan might be an important indication of Soviet offensive intentions, the completion of double tracking of these lines is not considered necessary prior to a Soviet offensive in Europe.

c. There continues to be no fully reliable information of unusual military activity in Hungary although there is a possibility that unidentified Soviet elements may be filtering into the country, particularly in the restricted area on the southern border.

d. On the basis of several reports of the arrival of additional Soviet tanks in Rumania, the assignment of 100 additional Soviet tanks to the Rumanian Army is accepted as true. It is possible that additional equipment has arrived either for Soviet or Rumanian troops.

e. In Bulgaria, the callups of reservists for training is apparently continuing, although some have reportedly been released. It is considered that these callups have been intended to test the mobilization machinery as well as for refresher training.

f. Based on reports from several areas, there is reason to believe that Soviet troops in Europe may soon enter into large-scale maneuvers, possibly involving a movement of forces in Southeast Europe. Information from Germany indicates that small unit training is drawing to a close and that larger scale exercises will start soon. Inter-divisional maneuvers last year were not held until October. In Rumania there is some evidence of a movement of Soviet troops, and a concentration of rolling stock in Hungary suggests a possible troop movement. There was a report several weeks ago that the Soviets would conduct large scale maneuvers in Europe in August and September accompanied by maneuvers of the Black Sea fleet. There is as yet no indication that the Black Sea maneuvers have started.

g. There has been a severe curtailment of gasoline allotments to the German economy and to civilians in at least portions of the Soviet Zone within the past two weeks, and gasoline allotments to at least one Soviet military unit have been curtailed. There is no evidence of unusually large eastward shipments and a reliable report indicates that service stations in Thuringia were to be filled to capacity and sealed. It thus appears that the gasoline conserved is going into storage in the Soviet Zone. In Rumania, there have been indications for several weeks of a growing shortage of petroleum products for civilian use and the shortage is now reported to be acute. Shortages in Rumania may be the result of increased needs of the Rumanian Army, stockpiling, or shipments to the Soviet Union or Bulgaria. The reasons for these unusual conservation measures in Europe are undetermined; larger gasoline stocks may be intended for military maneuvers, increasing reserve levels, or for war stockpiles. There have been previous indications of unusual petroleum conservation measures in the Soviet Union and of increased shipments to Bulgaria.

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h. A reliable although unconfirmed report states that 47 large air raid shelters are to be completed in Slovakia by the end of September 1950. Other indications of the scheduled completion of various military construction projects in Europe by September have been previously reported.

i. An increase in air traffic along the Soviet-Finnish frontier has been reported but there has been no other recent evidence of unusual military activity on the Finnish border.

j. From the foregoing it is concluded that:

(1) There is no conclusive evidence of imminent hostilities against Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East.

(2) There are continuing indications of preparations for such action, and there is recent evidence of unusual conservation of fuel supplies in Europe and of preparations for large-scale maneuvers which could be preliminaries to an offensive.

(3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.

3. Other Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. Soviet merchant vessels may be refueling submarines at sea. Several Soviet vessels have recently taken on diesel fuel in foreign ports, which they do not burn, nor usually carry, and have arrived in port two or three days late. This activity indicates that recently reported submarine sightings off Newfoundland may be true. A Soviet merchant vessel departed suddenly from Genoa and the Polish liner Batory left New York 2 days ahead of schedule. These appear, however, to have been isolated occurrences and there is no evidence of a general departure of Soviet vessels from foreign ports. Recent movements of Soviet shipping from the Baltic area suggest that the U.S.S.R. may have a need for vessels in other areas, particularly the Far East and the Black Sea.

b. The Soviets have recently announced a new medal to be awarded for distinction in guarding the frontier.

c. There continues to be no evidence of general Communist sabotage although occasional instances have been reported. The Italian and French Communist Parties are planning to concentrate on peace campaigns during the next two or three months and there is no suggestion that this is to be combined with a planned campaign of violence.

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e. [REDACTED] is reported  
to have defined Soviet intentions as follows:

Chinese Communist troops will enter the Korean war and are already in North Korea; the North Korean ability to advance in the face of U.S. air superiority was a surprise to the Soviets and may result in a revision of Soviet planning; Soviet plans for an invasion of Japan exist but no date has been set; Chinese Communist plans to invade Taiwan only await Soviet naval support; there is as great a danger of an explosion in Yugoslavia as in Korea.

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